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	<title>Comments on: Botnets, Malware and the Fortune 100</title>
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	<link>http://cassandrasecurity.com/?p=859</link>
	<description>Analysis of the security industry, and all that it influences.</description>
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		<title>By: Ken Beames</title>
		<link>http://cassandrasecurity.com/?p=859&#038;cpage=1#comment-351</link>
		<dc:creator>Ken Beames</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 Dec 2009 20:27:10 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Right-o Scott!  I&#039;m looking forward to reading the next installment!

All the best!  -Ken.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Right-o Scott!  I&#8217;m looking forward to reading the next installment!</p>
<p>All the best!  -Ken.</p>
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		<title>By: Scott Lupfer</title>
		<link>http://cassandrasecurity.com/?p=859&#038;cpage=1#comment-340</link>
		<dc:creator>Scott Lupfer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2009 03:51:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Ken, thanks for the comment and I&#039;m glad you take issue with my first assumption because that is the basis of my &quot;more later&quot; statement.  There is a huge gap between what a company may have the resources or ability to do and what they choose to actually do with regards to security.  If that were not true we wouldn&#039;t need PCI DSS to tell us how to protect credit card information or HIPAA to tell us how to protect personal healthcare information or...you get the idea.

We wouldn&#039;t need these legislative and/or regulatory requirements because organizations would choose to implement quality security programs from the start rather than wait for something to happen to analyze whether or not they should do something from preventing that from happening again.

Thanks again for your comment and your sharing your experience.

Scott</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ken, thanks for the comment and I&#8217;m glad you take issue with my first assumption because that is the basis of my &#8220;more later&#8221; statement.  There is a huge gap between what a company may have the resources or ability to do and what they choose to actually do with regards to security.  If that were not true we wouldn&#8217;t need PCI DSS to tell us how to protect credit card information or HIPAA to tell us how to protect personal healthcare information or&#8230;you get the idea.</p>
<p>We wouldn&#8217;t need these legislative and/or regulatory requirements because organizations would choose to implement quality security programs from the start rather than wait for something to happen to analyze whether or not they should do something from preventing that from happening again.</p>
<p>Thanks again for your comment and your sharing your experience.</p>
<p>Scott</p>
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		<title>By: Ken Beames</title>
		<link>http://cassandrasecurity.com/?p=859&#038;cpage=1#comment-339</link>
		<dc:creator>Ken Beames</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Dec 2009 16:40:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Scott, great thoughts.  I do have issue with your first assumption.  I used to work for a very large bank in the information risk management group, and though they had the resources, were coveted by every security vendor on the planet, and had established positions, policies and procedures, the business drivers were such that risk was something to take the run at.  They made more money than fines, or bad press would impact and when faced with a choice to secure, or not to secure, they usually choose to not secure as it would impact the business in interruption of service, impact on flexibility of working, etc.

What I learned is that running the risk (acceptable residual risk), whether formally, or informally accepted (like through denial) is a relatively effective risk management strategy for them.

All the best!  -Ken.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scott, great thoughts.  I do have issue with your first assumption.  I used to work for a very large bank in the information risk management group, and though they had the resources, were coveted by every security vendor on the planet, and had established positions, policies and procedures, the business drivers were such that risk was something to take the run at.  They made more money than fines, or bad press would impact and when faced with a choice to secure, or not to secure, they usually choose to not secure as it would impact the business in interruption of service, impact on flexibility of working, etc.</p>
<p>What I learned is that running the risk (acceptable residual risk), whether formally, or informally accepted (like through denial) is a relatively effective risk management strategy for them.</p>
<p>All the best!  -Ken.</p>
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		<title>By: Will Gragido</title>
		<link>http://cassandrasecurity.com/?p=859&#038;cpage=1#comment-259</link>
		<dc:creator>Will Gragido</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2009 00:10:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Scott, 

Great article.  Great post.  That was a troubling story and the facts as you pointed out are pretty staggering as are the unanswered questions (or details which have not been provided), pertaining the remainder of the Fortune 500.   This I think demonstrates the need for advanced solution sets and different approaches to threat mitigation.   Botnets in particular are devilishly difficult to detect and address as in many respects they utilize sophisticated routing solutions, topoogies, C&amp;C elements, cryptography etc.   Botnets are definitely not your father&#039;s malware!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Scott, </p>
<p>Great article.  Great post.  That was a troubling story and the facts as you pointed out are pretty staggering as are the unanswered questions (or details which have not been provided), pertaining the remainder of the Fortune 500.   This I think demonstrates the need for advanced solution sets and different approaches to threat mitigation.   Botnets in particular are devilishly difficult to detect and address as in many respects they utilize sophisticated routing solutions, topoogies, C&#038;C elements, cryptography etc.   Botnets are definitely not your father&#8217;s malware!</p>
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